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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
An environmental group seeking to protect a state lake from
toxic mercury pollution... a power company faced with the pros-
pect of being shut down, even though it has complied with all ap-
plicable environmental laws... these are the dilemmas presented
in the instant appeal. At the heart of this dispute lie several un-
resolved issues in modern environmental jurisprudence. The fol-
lowing memorandum will address and explore both sides of every
issue, with the intent of clarifying the arguments as they are
presented by the respective parties.
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First, this appeal requires the determination of whether
smokestack emissions fall under the definition of "solid waste"
found in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") of
1976. The statute is silent with respect to this particular form of
waste discharge. However, certain provisions of the statute, its
regulations, the congressional record, and case law shed some
light on the legislative intent with respect to such emissions. This
article will identify those arguments which best support the inter-
pretation advanced by each party.
Second, this appeal addresses the nature of standing in envi-
ronmental actions. In the past several decades, standing to bring
a citizen suit under an environmental statute has undergone an
evolution with varying degrees of strictness and expansiveness in
relation to who may bring an action. In its current incarnation,
standing requires the basic constitutional requirements, plus the
satisfaction of the "zone-of-interest" test, which mandates that
prospective plaintiffs be within the zone of interest intended to be
protected by the applicable statute. Whether a particular plaintiff
falls into that zone of interest is open to debate, but the Supreme
Court gave a green light, perhaps unintentionally, in its Bennett v.
Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997), decision to a very expansive reading of
zone of interest standing to include, in certain circumstances, "any
person." The task in this case is to determine whether the plain-
tiffs can establish standing under current standing jurisprudence.
Third, this appeal highlights the potential conflict between
environmental statutes, when one authorizes an activity that the
other strictly forbids. In this case, the conflict arises when Buena
Vista's air emissions, which are permitted under both state and
federal clean air laws, are alleged to have caused environmental
degradation on the scale of a public nuisance under RCRA. The
resolution of this issue will hinge primarily on an assessment of
the policy considerations involved in either tolerating environ-
mental pollution in order to uphold regulatory consistency, or sac-
rificing industry's confidence in the uniformity of environmental
enforcement for the sake of better protecting natural resources.
Finally, this appeal addresses whether the plaintiffs' action in
this case is barred under either section 7002(b) of the statute or
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Under sec-
tion 7002(b), the question arises whether the intervention of the
State of New Union constitutes diligent prosecution for the pur-
pose of prohibiting a citizen suit, since it is commonly stated that
citizen suit provisions are intended to authorize private attorneys
2000]
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general in circumstances where the government neglects its duty
to act. Res judicata and collateral estoppel are evaluated in rela-
tion to the previous action brought against Buena Vista by
Bluepeace, Inc., and the question raised in this section of the ap-
peal depends on whether the two actions against Buena Vista in-
volve the same parties or their privy and the same set of operative
facts.
Suggested Questions for Judges
1. Are mercury emissions from coal burning utility plants
"solid waste" as defined by RCRA?
In what way does the holding in Connecticut Coastal Fisher-
men's Ass'n v. Remington Arms Co., Inc. impact on the propriety of
the district court's reliance on the regulatory definition of "solid
waste" to support its conclusion that Buena Vista's mercury emis-
sions are solid waste?
What support is there in the congressional history of RCRA
for the proposition that smokestack emissions should or should
not be considered solid waste?
Are emissions in a smokestack "contained" for the purposes of
RCRA?
How does the fact that smokestack emissions are comprehen-
sively regulated under the Clean Air Act impact on the district
court's ruling that they are also regulated under RCRA?
What are the policy reasons for or against having smokestack
emissions regulated as "solid waste" under RCRA?
Does the EPA's regulatory exclusion of certain coal-burning
utility plant emissions from the definition of hazardous waste sup-
port the conclusion that Buena Vista's emissions are solid waste,
since something cannot be a hazardous waste under RCRA with-
out being a solid waste?
2. Did the court below err in holding that Friends of Lake
Tokay, Inc. has no standing to bring the instant case?
What is "zone-of-interests" standing and how does it differ
from constitutional standing?
Is the voluntary decision of the members of Friends of Lake
Tokay to stop eating Lake Tokay fish adequate to establish an in-
jury-in-fact for standing purposes?
398 [Vol. 17
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* Is Friends of Lake Tokay within the zone of interests to be
protected by RCRA?
* If the members of Friends of Lake Tokay are no longer eat-
ing the fish that they catch, what is the "imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment" which the plaintiffs seek to abate?
What was the holding of the Supreme Court in Bennett v.
Spear with respect to zone-of-interests standing, and how does
that holding impact on this case?
Is the environmental or aesthetic degradation of Lake Tokay
an injury-in-fact sufficient to grant standing to Friends of Lake
Tokay?
3. Did the court below err in holding that New Union has
standing to bring this case?
What is the doctrine of parens patriae, and how does it apply
in this case?
Do the provisions of the statute support or argue against a
reading which allows states to sue under the "imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment" citizen suits provision?
What "imminent and substantial endangerment" is the State
of New Union seeking to abate?
Is New Union in effect attempting to litigate the private
claims of a few of its citizens?
4. Did the court below err in holding that regulation of
mercury emissions from major air pollution sources,
including fossil fuel fired power plants, by the Clean
Air Act, coupled with the regulation of emissions
from Buena Vista's plants by permits issued under the
Clean Air Act, justified the court's refusal to exercise its
equitable authority under RCRA to order abatement of
Buena Vista's mercury emissions?
Would regulation of Buena Vista's emissions under both the
Clean Air Act and RCRA be in compliance with section 1006(b) of
RCRA, which directs the EPA to avoid duplication of the two
statutes?
What is the significance in this case of RCRA's specific exclu-
sion from the definition of "solid waste" of discharges authorized
by a permit under the Clean Water Act?
How does the fact that the EPA has not yet issued regulations
governing the release of mercury emissions from coal-burning
2000] 399
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utility plants under the Clean Air Act impact on Friends of Lake
Tokay's argument in this case?
Is the suit brought by Friends of Lake Tokay an impermissi-
ble end-run around the statutory limitations on the judicial review
of permits under the Clean Air Act? Why or why not?
What are the policy implications of allowing an "imminent
and substantial endangerment" suit under RCRA to abate activi-
ties which are authorized by permits issued under other environ-
mental statutes?
5(i). Should this court rule on whether appellants are
precluded by RCRA § 7002(b) or the doctrines of res
judicata or collateral estoppel from pursuing this
action?
Would judicial economy be better served by disposing of
Buena Vista's motion in this court rather than leaving it for the
District Court on remand? Why or why not?
Does the resolution of Buena Vista's motion involve substan-
tial issues of fact, such that it would be best left for the trial court
to evaluate and determine?
5(ii). Are the appellants precluded by RCRA § 7002(b), or
the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel from
pursuing this action because of the state court decision
in Bluepeace, Inc. v. Buena Vista Power Co.?
Is a citizen suit proper only when a governmental authority
has not responded to an environmental threat or violation?
Does the State of New Union's intervention in this case make
the Friends of Lake Tokay's action duplicative and unnecessary?
Are the State of New Union and Friends of Lake Tokay par-
ties in privity with Bluepeace, Inc?
Do both the instant case and Bluepeace, Inc. v. Buena Vista
Power Co. arise out of the same set of operative facts or series of
connected transactions?
What effect does the statutory language providing that "[n]o
action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this sec-
tion if the State... has commenced... an action under subsection
(a)(1)(B) of this section" have on Buena Vista's argument, since
the State of New Union commenced its action after the citizen suit
was initiated?
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. ARE MERCURY EMISSIONS FROM COAL BURNING
UTILITY PLANTS "SOLID WASTE" AS DEFINED
BY RCRA?
A. The definition of "solid waste" under the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act (hereinafter "RCRA") cannot be con-
strued to include the mercury emissions discharged from the
smokestacks of coal burning utility plants for the following rea-
sons. First, the terms of the statute itself do not include dis-
charges into the air within the definition of "solid waste." The
definition of "solid waste" in RCRA states that "[tihe term 'solid
waste' means any ... solid, liquid, semi-solid, or contained gase-
ous material." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1995). Non-contained gase-
ous materials, such as the air emissions at issue in this case, are
not listed in the definition of solid waste. Following the maxim of
statutory interpretation 'inclusio unius est exclusio alterius,' or
'the inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of another,' given the
inclusion of contained gaseous material in the definition of "solid
waste" and the exclusion of non-contained gaseous material from
that definition, the term "solid waste" can never include non-con-
tained gases such as air emissions. Accordingly, the mercury
emissions released through Buena Vista's smokestacks are not
solid waste under RCRA.
Second, the gaseous mercury emissions cannot be conve-
niently deemed "solids" by the district court in an effort to create
the authority to regulate Buena Vista under RCRA. The court be-
low placed reliance on its misconception that mercury "particles"
are actually solids, and therefore not limited by the contained gas-
eous material definition. This finding ignores the physics of mer-
cury, which have been recently documented by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter "EPA"). See Poten-
tial Revisions to the Land Disposal Restrictions Mercury Treat-
ment Standard, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,949, 28,958 (1999). The EPA
found that
[mlercury is slightly volatile at ambient temperatures but is
quite volatile at temperatures common to thermal treatment de-
vices. It boils at approximately 356 degrees Celsius and typi-
cally escapes with other stack gases from incineration. With
respect to mercury behavior in combustion systems and existing
control techniques, mercury is volatilized and converted into el-
emental mercury in the high temperature regions of furnaces.
2000] 401
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Id.
Thus, mercury vaporizes into mercury molecules in the same
way that water vaporizes into water molecules when heated. The
district court's holding that "particles" are solids for RCRA pur-
poses could conceivably apply to all true gases, i.e. those found in
gaseous form at normal temperatures, because all true gases con-
sist of individual elemental particles. However, it is obvious that
a gas, although composed of molecules, is a gas and not a solid. In
interpreting a statute, one must give meaning to all the terms con-
tained therein. If "solid waste" is defined as "solid, liquid, semi-
solid, or contained gaseous material," gaseous material must nec-
essarily be something other than a solid, and vice versa. In the
instant case, the district court equated gaseous material with
solid material merely because both are composed of "particles."
That conclusion negated the separate meanings of each term. Ac-
cordingly, it was error for the district court to conclude that gase-
ous "particles" are solids for the purposes of RCRA.
Third, the regulatory definition of "solid waste" cannot sup-
port a finding that the mercury emissions are solid waste. The
court below held that since the regulatory definition of solid waste
defined it as a material that has been "disposed of," and since "dis-
posal" is defined by the statute to mean "the discharge, deposit,
injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste
... into or on any land or water so that such solid waste.., or any
constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into
the air or discharged into any water," the mercury emissions are
allegedly solid waste. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(b)(1) (1999); 42 U.S.C.
§ 6903(3) (1995). However, the regulatory definition cannot ex-
tend EPA's jurisdiction beyond the jurisdiction inherent in the
statutory definition, and it is clear that the words of the statute do
not support such a finding. Disposal occurs, according to RCRA,
only when a material has been discharged or in some other way
released "into or on any land or water." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3)
(1995). Thus, a prerequisite to a finding of disposal requires a re-
lease into or on land or water. In the instant case, the release of
the mercury emissions was into the air, and therefore cannot be
considered to be disposed of under RCRA. The fact that such mer-
cury may have eventually entered a water body, an allegation on
which the court placed great importance, is an irrelevant inquiry
since the threshold finding of a release into water or land has not
been satisfied. Accordingly, because the mercury emissions were
402 [Vol. 17
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not "disposed of' as contemplated by the statute, they cannot be
considered solid waste under the regulations.
In any event, the regulatory definition of "solid waste" is inap-
plicable to an action under the "imminent and substantial endan-
germent" citizen suits provision of RCRA, section 7002. See
Connecticut Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. Remington Arms Co.,
Inc., 989 F.2d 1305, 1314-5 (2d Cir. 1993). In Remington Arms,
citizens brought an action against owners and operators of a trap
and skeet shoot club for alleged violations of the Clean Water Act
and RCRA. When confronted with both the statutory and regula-
tory definitions of "solid waste," the Second Circuit was forced to
interpret EPA's understanding of the regulatory definition. It
found that "the statutory definition of solid waste . . . applies to
'imminent hazard' lawsuits . . . under § 7003." Connecticut
Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n, 989 F.2d at 1314. Holding that "regu-
latory language referring to § 7003 must also apply to
§ 7002(a)(1)(B) [imminent and substantial endangerment suits]
because the two provisions are nearly identical," the court con-
cluded that "the broader statutory definition of solid waste applies
to citizen suits brought to abate imminent hazard to health or the
environment." Id. at 1315. Therefore, the district court in the in-
stant case erred in applying the regulatory definition of "solid
waste" to a suit brought under the "imminent and substantial en-
dangerment" citizen suits provision of RCRA.
Finally, the EPA has explicitly limited its authority under
RCRA not to extend to air emissions. Specifically, the EPA has
stated that its "authority to identify or list a waste as hazardous
under RCRA is limited to containerized or condensed gases (i.e.,
Section 1004(27) of RCRA excludes all other gases from the defini-
tion of solid wastes and thus cannot be considered hazardous
wastes)." Hazardous Waste Management System: Identification
and Listing of Hazardous Waste CERCLA; Hazardous Waste Des-
iguation; Reportable Quantity Adjustment, 54 Fed. Reg. 50,968,
50,973 (1989) (emphasis added). Since the mercury emissions re-
leased through the Buena Vista smokestacks are not container-
ized or condensed gases, according to the EPA, they are not solid
wastes and, accordingly, there exists no authority under RCRA to
regulate the emissions. Similarly, the EPA has determined that
gases within an exhaust or emissions system are not "container-
ized" for the purposes of RCRA. See In re Chemical Waste Manage-
ment of Indiana, Inc., 1995 WL 523542, at 12 (E.P.A.) (holding
that "[t]he agency has interpreted this explicit inclusion of con-
2000] 403
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tainerized gaseous materials as constituting an explicit exclusion
of uncontainerized gases," and therefore air emissions generated
by on-site macroencapsulation operations are not subject to RCRA
regulation.); see also The Hazardous Waste Management System,
47 Fed. Reg. 27,520 (1982) (stating that fume incinerators used to
destroy gaseous emissions from industrial processes are subject to
regulation under the Clean Air Act, but are not subject to regula-
tion under RCRA). As outlined in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984), when a stat-
ute is ambiguous, the administering agency's reasonable interpre-
tation may not be displaced by an alternative interpretation of the
reviewing court. Because the EPA's interpretation of its own au-
thority under RCRA is a permissible construction of the statute,
its finding that such authority does not extend to air emissions
must be upheld. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
B. Buena Vista's mercury emissions are subject to regula-
tion under RCRA for the following reasons. First, the statute de-
fines "solid waste" as "discarded material," which includes the
mercury waste that is "discarded" in Buena Vista's smokestack
emissions. The statutory definition of "solid waste" includes "any
garbage, refuse... and other discarded material, including solid,
liquid, semi-solid, or contained gaseous material. . ." 42 U.S.C.
§ 6903(27) (1995) (emphasis added). Because the term "including"
in the above-quoted provision expands the term "discarded mate-
rial," it is clear that solid, liquid, semi-solid and contained gaseous
wastes are only some examples of the kinds of discarded material
that are included under the RCRA "solid waste" definition. There-
fore, the definition of "solid waste" is not limited to "solid, liquid,
semi-solid, and contained gaseous material." It is well established
that a statute shall be construed in accordance with the plain
meaning and common understanding of the terms contained
therein, unless a term is otherwise defined by the statute itself.
The term "discard" is not defined in RCRA. However, it is defined
in the dictionary as meaning "to throw away; reject." The smoke-
stack emissions released by Buena Vista are clearly "discarded" in
the common sense of the word, in that Buena Vista rejected the
mercury waste by throwing it away via the smokestacks. There-
fore, the mercury emissions fall within the statutory definition of
solid waste as "discarded material." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1995).
Second, the regulatory definition of "solid waste" includes
"any discarded material." 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a)(1) (1999). A "dis-
carded material" is any material which is "abandoned." 40 C.F.R.
404 [Vol. 17
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§ 261.2(a)(2) (1999). A material is "abandoned" when it has been
"disposed of." 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(b)(1) (1999). Finally, "disposal" is
defined by the statute to mean "the discharge, deposit, injection,
dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste.., into or
on any land or water so that such solid waste ... or any constitu-
ent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the air
or discharged into any water." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1995). Be-
cause the mercury leaves the smokestack and is deposited on and
in the surrounding land and water, it is disposed of as defined by
the regulations and is therefore solid waste. The fact that it
passes through air first is of no moment: no one would make the
claim that you are watering the air when your sprinkler waters
your lawn just because the water passes through the air on its
way down to the lawn. Finally, RCRA regulations state: "The fol-
lowing solid wastes are not hazardous wastes: ... [fily ash waste,
bottom ash waste, slag waste, and flue gas emission control waste,
generated primarily from the combustion of coal or other fossil fu-
els.. ." 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(4) (1999) (emphasis added). Although
this provision relates to the regulation of hazardous waste, and is
therefore inapplicable to an "imminent and substantial endanger-
ment action," it is highly relevant to the EPA's categorization of
coal smokestack emissions. Section 261.4(b)(4) of the RCRA regu-
lations explicitly states that combustion by-products of coal are
solid wastes, but they will be exempted from the definition of haz-
ardous waste. See id. Therefore, since emissions from the com-
bustion of coal are clearly stated to be solid wastes by the very
terms of the regulation, they are accordingly subject to RCRA
regulation.
II. DID THE COURT BELOW ERR IN HOLDING THAT
FRIENDS OF LAKE TOKAY, INC. HAS NO
STANDING TO BRING THE INSTANT CASE?
A. Every plaintiff in a case or controversy must establish
that he or she has standing to bring the action. In simple terms,
the doctrine of standing can be defined as "whether a litigant is
entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute." 32A
AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 675 (1995). In determining whether
a plaintiff has standing, courts are limited both by constitutional
restraints on federal jurisdiction, and by prudential constraints on
the exercise of that jurisdiction. See Valley Forge Christian Col-
lege v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498
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(1975)) ("The term 'standing' subsumes a blend of constitutional
requirements and prudential considerations. . ."). The constitu-
tional limits on standing emanate from the Article III "case or con-
troversy" clause, and require that a plaintiff establish 1) an
injury-in-fact, 2) a causal connection between the injury and the
challenged conduct, and 3) the redressability of the injury by a
favorable decision. See Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at
471-2; Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99
(1979); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.
26, 38, 41 (1976); see also 32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 676
(1995). In order to establish an injury-in-fact, the plaintiff must
demonstrate "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is
concrete and particularized" and that is "traditionally thought to
be capable of resolution through the judicial process." Raines v.
Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997); see also Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). It is not sufficient to assert an
interest that is indistinguishable from the interests of the general
public. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975).
In the instant case, Friends of Lake Tokay, Inc. have not es-
tablished an injury-in-fact because they have failed to demon-
strate "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is concrete
and particularized." Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. at 819. The only
"injury" alleged by the plaintiff is that certain of its members have
voluntarily discontinued eating fish caught in Lake Tokay due to
concerns over the health advisory issued by the state. While the
members may have a right to fish in Lake Tokay and to eat the
fish they catch, neither Buena Vista nor the state have invaded
that right since the members may continue to fish and enjoy their
catch without interference. However, they have voluntarily de-
cided to forego eating Lake Tokay fish due to their own health
concerns. The mere self-imposed discontinuance of a particular
activity is not "an invasion of a legally protected interest" suffi-
cient to establish standing.
The members' claim of "injury" is analogous to the injury suf-
fered by someone who decides one day to stop drinking diet soda
because of health concerns over saccharine, and then the next day
files an action against the soda maker for the loss of his ability to
enjoy diet soda. Clearly, any injury suffered is self-inflicted. "No
[plaintiff] can be heard to complain about damage inflicted from
its own hand." Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 664
(1976). Accordingly, since no injury can be established, Friends of
Lake Tokay, Inc. has no standing to bring the instant action.
[Vol. 17406
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In addition to the constitutional injury-in-fact, causation, and
redressability limitations on standing, prudential doctrine man-
dates that when suit is brought under a statutory citizen suits
provision, the particular plaintiff must be within the "zone of in-
terests" protected or regulated by the statute. See Association of
Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970). In Association of Data Processing, the plaintiff association
of data processors sought to prevent banks from making data
processing services available to other banks and customers. The
district court and court of appeals had both dismissed the suit for
lack of standing. Association of Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 151.
In reversing the lower courts' decisions on the issue of standing,
the Supreme Court held that "apart from the 'case' or 'controversy'
test, the question [of standing is] whether the interest sought to be
protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of inter-
ests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question." Id. at 153. The Court concluded by ruling
that the statute at issue "arguably brings a competitor within the
zone of interests protected by it." Id. at 156.
The zones of interest protected by section 7002(a)(1)(B) of
RCRA are those threatened by an "imminent and substantial en-
dangerment." 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (1995). It has been held
that if a potential plaintiff is able to avoid the hazard at relatively
little inconvenience, the danger posed may no longer be imminent
as contemplated by the citizen suits provision. See Davies v. Na-
tional Coop. Refinery Ass'n, 963 F.Supp. 990, 999 (D. Kan. 1997).
In Davies, the plaintiffs brought an "imminent and substantial en-
dangerment" suit under RCRA, alleging that the defendants had
contaminated the groundwater underlying the plaintiffs' property
with cancer-causing agents. Under the circumstances of the case,
the District Court for the District of Kansas ruled that abstention
was appropriate to allow the state Department of Health and En-
vironment to complete its investigation and develop a remedial
plan. See Davies, 963 F.Supp. at 999. However, the court went on
to state that it had considered the nature of the threat posed by
the contamination to the groundwater. It found that the facts as
presented did "not establish or address the likelihood that any
person will actually be exposed to" the endangerment because the
"plaintiffs have been warned of the danger and are able to occupy
the property without serious risk to their health by using an alter-
nate water supply. . ." Id. The district court found further that
the "fact that [the plaintiffs] must use bottled water instead of
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groundwater is undoubtedly an inconvenience and an economic
burden, but it is the type of injury for which an action at law [as
opposed to the equitable injunctive relief available under section
7002] provides an adequate remedy." Id. Accordingly, the plain-
tiffs' action would not have been sustained under RCRA section
7002.
In the instant case, even if Friends of Lake Tokay, Inc. could
be found to have established an injury-in-fact, the loss of the abil-
ity to eat fish is not an injury within the "zone of interests" pro-
tected or regulated by the statute. Section 7002(a)(1)(B)'s
application is limited only to creating an equitable cause of action
to abate an "imminent and substantial endangerment." Since the
plaintiffs members have in effect removed themselves from the
path of harm by ceasing to eat potentially tainted fish, they can-
not assert that they are exposed to an imminent danger. See Da-
vies, 963 F.Supp. at 999. Because there is no imminent danger to
abate, the members do not fall within the zone of interests pro-
tected by section 7002(a)(1)(B). Therefore, they cannot establish
zone-of-interests standing to bring this case.
B. The court below erred when it found that Friends of Lake
Tokay, Inc. did not have standing to bring the instant action. It is
well established that noneconomic injuries to environmental or
aesthetic interests are "injuries-in-fact" sufficient to confer stand-
ing on a plaintiff. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734
(1972); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973). Actions that "impair
the [plaintiffs] enjoyment of' a natural resource can amount to an
injury-in-fact. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. at 734. Moreover,
the injury asserted need not be great or substantial, and an "iden-
tifiable trifle" may give rise to standing. See Conservation Council
of North Carolina v. Costanzo, 505 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974).
In this case, the plaintiffs members have clearly suffered an
injury to their aesthetic interest in Lake Tokay. Specifically, the
pollution caused by Buena Vista has impaired the members' en-
joyment of their fishing activities. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. at 734. If the members can no longer eat their catch, the fruit
of their labor cannot be enjoyed. Even if one considers the loss of
the ability to eat fish to be an "identifiable trifle," it is an injury
nonetheless. Accordingly, the plaintiff has established a cogniza-
ble injury-in-fact by demonstrating the diminishment of its mem-
bers' fishing enjoyment.
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Additionally, the zone-of-interests doctrine does not preclude
Friends of Lake Tokay from bringing the instant action. The zone-
of-interests doctrine is a prudential limitation, and it is applicable
to all cases unless expressly negated or expanded by an act of Con-
gress. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163-64 (1997).
In Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997), the Supreme Court
held that when a citizen suit provision in an environmental stat-
ute states that "any person" may commence a civil suit, the provi-
sion shall be interpreted "at face value" as negating the zone-of-
interest requirement for standing. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. at
165. The specific statute in that case was the Endangered Species
Act, in which the citizen suits provision stated that "any person
may commence a civil suit on his own behalf ... to enjoin any
person... who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this
chapter or regulation issued under the authority thereof." 16
U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (1985). Since the terms of the statute ex-
plicitly allowed "any person" to bring an action, "any person"
would necessarily be included in the zone-of-interest of the stat-
ute. The Court deduced that since the purpose of citizen suits pro-
visions is to encourage enforcement actions by "private attorneys
general," "the [congressional] intent to permit enforcement by ev-
eryman" would further that goal. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. at
165-66 (emphasis added).
In the instant case, the plaintiffs action is brought under the
citizen suits provision of an environmental statute, which states
that "any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf'
to abate an imminent and substantial endangerment. 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a)(1)(B) (1995). Since the language in the instant statute
is identical to the language at issue in Bennett v. Spear, the hold-
ing in that case is directly applicable. Accordingly, the effect of
this broad provision is to negate the zone-of-interest tests of pru-
dential standing. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. at 164. As in Ben-
nett v. Spear, the plaintiff in an "imminent and substantial
endangerment" suit is not required to demonstrate zone-of-inter-
est standing due to the clear mandate from Congress that "any
person" may bring an action under section 7002(a)(1)(B) of RCRA.
Therefore, the court below erred in holding that Friends of Lake
Tokay, Inc. did not have standing because its injury was not
within the zone of interest of the statute.
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III. DID THE COURT BELOW ERR IN HOLDING THAT
NEW UNION HAS STANDING TO BRING THIS
CASE?
A. The district court erred in holding that the State of New
Union has standing to intervene in this case. The State of New
Union is the trustee for the public benefit of the navigable waters
within its boundaries, and as such it has no proprietary interest in
the waters and fish of the state. The State's trusteeship is merely
an expression of the State's power to regulate in order to protect
and preserve the trust. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519
(1896); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) ("The whole owner-
ship theory, in fact, is now generally regarded as but a fiction ex-
pressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a
State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an
important resource." 334 U.S. at 402). If the State of New Union
wants to protect its natural resources, it may do so through the
exercise of its police powers by adopting protective legislation.
Because the State has no proprietary interest in Lake Tokay
and its fish, it cannot aver that it has suffered an injury caused by
Buena Vista's air emissions. Accordingly, as a trustee, New Union
may not bring a civil suit to redress an injury to its waters and
fish.
A state may have standing to bring an action as parens pa-
triae on behalf of its citizens, but "only when its sovereign or
quasi-sovereign interests are implicated and it is not merely liti-
gating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens." Penn-
sylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 665 (1976). When the state's
claim consists of nothing more than a collectivity of private suits,
the parens patriae standing of the state will be denied. See Penn-
sylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. at 666. Because New Union has
failed to establish an injury to its sovereign interests, the purpose
of its intervention in this case must necessarily be to help litigate
the private claims of plaintiff Friends of Lake Tokay, Inc. There-
fore, its intervention must be denied.
B. The State of New Union has parens patriae standing to
intervene in the action against Buena Vista. It is well established
that a state has standing to bring an action as parens patriae on
behalf of its citizens, but only when its sovereign or quasi-sover-
eign interests are implicated. See Pennsylvania v. New Jersey,
426 U.S. 660, 665 (1976); United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 394
F.Supp. 233, 241-2 (D. Minn. 1974). Specifically, a state has been
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held to have standing when it seeks injunctive relief to abate the
discharge of noxious gases into the state's territory, Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1906), the discharge of oil and
other pollutants into state waters, Maine v. MIV Tomano, 357
F.Supp. 1097 (D. Me. 1973), Maryland Dep't of Natural Resources
v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F.Supp. 1060 (D. Md. 1972), and the
disposal of sewage or garbage, New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S.
296 (1921). As trustee, the State has a duty to protect and pre-
serve its natural resources for the public benefit. Therefore, "[the
conclusion seems inescapable . . . that if the State is deemed to be
the trustee of the waters, then, as trustee, the State must be em-
powered to bring suit to protect the corpus of the trust . . . ." Ma-
ryland Dep't of Natural Resources, 350 F.Supp. at 1067.
IV. DID THE COURT BELOW ERR IN HOLDING THAT
REGULATION OF MERCURY EMISSIONS FROM
MAJOR AIR POLLUTION SOURCES,
INCLUDING FOSSIL FUEL FIRED POWER
PLANTS, BY THE CLEAN AIR ACT, COUPLED
WITH THE REGULATION OF EMISSIONS FROM
BUENA VISTA'S PLANTS BY PERMITS ISSUED
UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT, JUSTIFIED THE
COURT'S REFUSAL TO EXERCISE ITS EQUITABLE
AUTHORITY UNDER RCRA TO ORDER
ABATEMENT OF BUENA VISTA's MERCURY
EMISSIONS?
A. Section 1006(b) of RCRA states
[tihe Administrator shall integrate all provisions of this chapter
for purposes of administration and enforcement and shall avoid
duplication, to the maximum extent practicable, with the appro-
priate provisions of the Clean Air Act, the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Marine Pro-
tection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, and such other
Acts of Congress as grant regulatory authority to the
Administrator.
42 U.S.C § 6905(b)(1) (1995).
This provision indicates a congressional intent that activities
which are regulated under the Clean Air Act, as well as other stat-
utes administered by the EPA, should not be regulated in a dupli-
cative manner under RCRA. In United States v. Burns, 512
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F.Supp. 916 (W.D. Penn. 1981), the District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania analyzed section 1006 as it related to al-
legedly duplicative regulation under the Toxic Substances Control
Act (hereinafter "TSCA"). In that case, the government brought
an action against the defendants under TSCA regarding the inap-
propriate storage of Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs). An order
was issued in the first action, to which the defendants consented.
The government then brought a subsequent action under RCRA
seeking injunctive relief. The defendants countered that RCRA
section 1006(b) barred the duplicative regulation of PCBs under
RCRA because PCBs were already regulated under TSCA. Find-
ing that "[ulnder TSCA the EPA Administrator has promulgated
regulations dealing with disposal of PCBs, as well as the handling
and storage of PCBs" and "TSCA adequately addresses the
problems of disposal of PCBs and pollution of groundwater,
... [a]llowing the Government to proceed under both TSCA and
RCRA would permit the kind of duplication that section 1006(b) of
RCRA is designed to prevent." Burns, 512 F.Supp. at 919. The
court rejected the government's argument that there should be "a
broad overlap of enforcement mechanisms in environmental law,"
id. at 918, and dismissed the government's claim under RCRA.
The instant case is analogous to the attempted double-regula-
tion in United States v. Burns. Pursuant to the Clean Air Act, the
EPA has commissioned studies and promulgated comprehensive
regulations addressing mercury air emissions discharged from
utility plants. Since air emissions are adequately and comprehen-
sively regulated under the Clean Air Act, allowing regulation
under both the Clean Air Act and RCRA "would permit the kind of
duplication that section 1006(b) of RCRA is designed to prevent."
United States v. Burns, 512 F.Supp. at 919. Accordingly, an action
under RCRA for activities that are already comprehensively regu-
lated under the Clean Air Act should be barred.
In Chemical Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. United States
Dep't of the Army, 111 F.3d 1485, 1490 (10th Cir. 1997), the Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit directly addressed the issue of
whether a permit for stack emissions authorized under the Clean
Air Act bars an action against the emissions, under a different en-
vironmental statute. It found that it did. In that case, the plain-
tiff citizen groups attempted to bring an action under section
301(f) of the Clean Water Act, which declares "it shall be unlawful
to discharge any radiological, chemical, or biological warfare
agent... into the navigable waters," 33 U.S.C. § 1311(f) (1999),
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against the Army to prevent it from incinerating chemical weap-
ons pursuant to a valid Clean Air Act permit. The plaintiffs main-
tained that the emissions would eventually find their way into the
navigable waters, thereby constituting a "discharge" into those
waters. Chemical Weapons Working Group, Inc., 111 F.3d at
1490. The Court of Appeals rejected that argument, stating that
it "would lead to irrational results" and that "common sense dic-
tates that . . . stack emissions constitute discharges to air-not
water-and are therefore beyond" the Clean Water Act's reach.
Id. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' Clean Water Act claim
because "it would create a regulatory conflict between the Clean
Water Act and Clean Air Act." Id. It found that "[b]ecause [the]
Clean Air Act permit specifically allows the discharges that Plain-
tiffs claim are barred under [the] Clean Water Act. . ., applying
[the Clean Water Act] to [the] stack emissions would create an
irreconcilable conflict between the two regulatory schemes." Id. at
1490-1. Accordingly, the court refused to apply the restrictions of
the Clean Water Act on the activities authorized by the Clean Air
Act.
In this case, Buena Vista was issued Clean Air Act permits for
its emissions under Blue Skies' approved permit program. The
permit provides for the regulation of mercury through monitoring,
and provides for modification if and when EPA promulgates limi-
tations under the Clean Air Act. Sustaining a RCRA challenge to
an activity that is expressly authorized by a permit issued under
the Clean Air Act "would create an irreconcilable conflict between
the two regulatory schemes." Chemical Weapons Working Group,
Inc. v. United States Dep't of the Army, 111 F.3d 1485, 1491 (10th
Cir. 1997). Therefore, the restrictions of RCRA in the instant ac-
tion should not be applied to Buena Vista's air emissions, which
are explicitly authorized under the Clean Air Act.
The EPA has expressly refused to establish standards under
the Clean Air Act for mercury emissions emitted by fossil fuel
fired utility plants. Despite the Clean Air Act's dominant role in
reducing hazardous air emissions, and despite the EPA's contin-
ued regulation of other hazardous air emissions from utility
plants, it has refrained from regulating mercury emissions from
utility plants. The EPA's refusal has been driven by its determi-
nation that additional information and research must be gathered
with respect to mercury air emissions from coal-burning utility
plants before standards can be imposed on the industry. There-
fore, since the EPA has determined that there is insufficient data
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at the present time to regulate Buena Vista's mercury emissions
under the Clean Air Act, it must similarly be EPA's determination
that there is insufficient data at the present time to regulate
Buena Vista's mercury emissions under RCRA.
Finally, Buena Vista has been operating with an approved
permit issued by the State of Blue Skies pursuant to the Clean Air
Act. This permit was subject to judicial review for a 60 day period
after its issuance. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1995). After the pe-
riod allowed for review passes, judicial review of the terms of the
permit cannot be sought in an enforcement proceeding such as a
citizens suit. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(2) (1995). Thus, an objector
to a permit cannot get around his failure to challenge the permit
within the applicable time period by initiating a citizens suit to
attack the permit provisions. See Chemical Weapons Working
Group, Inc. v. United States Dep't of the Army, 111 F.3d 1485 (10th
Cir. 1997); Greenpeace, Inc. v. Waste Technologies Indus., 9 F.3d
1174 (6th Cir. 1993); Palumbo v. Waste Technologies Indus., 989
F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1993); Delaware Valley Citizens Council for
Clean Air v. Davis, 932 F.2d 256 (3d Cir. 1991). In the instant
case, the plaintiffs now seek to end-run this prohibition on judicial
review of the Blue Skies Clean Air Act permits by attacking the
terms of the permits through an enforcement action under RCRA.
Accordingly, the instant action against Buena Vista should be dis-
missed as a prohibited end-run of the statutory limitations on per-
mit review. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1995).
B. RCRA section 1006(b) provides:
The Administrator shall integrate all provisions of this Act ...
and shall avoid duplication, to the maximum extent practicable,
with the appropriate provision of the Clean Air Act . . .Such
integration shall be effected only to the extent that it can be
done in a manner consistent with the goals and policies ex-
pressed in this Act.
42 U.S.C § 6905(b) (1995) (emphasis added).
The second sentence suggests that the provision "creates no
rights in defendants to resist regulation; rather it constitutes an
exhortation to the EPA to avoid unnecessary and overlapping reg-
ulation." United States v. Vineland Chem. Co., Inc., 692 F.Supp.
415, 420 (D.N.J. 1988). The purpose of section 6905(b) is to in-
struct the EPA to guard against wasteful regulation. It is error to
construe the section to invent "a right enforceable by the regu-
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lated" to avoid abiding by the requirements of RCRA. Vineland
Chem. Co., Inc., 692 F.Supp. at 421.
Moreover, when Congress does not want activities which are
authorized by provisions from other statutes to be regulated under
RCRA, it expressly provides so. For example, certain discharges
which have been duly permitted under the Clean Water Act are
explicitly exempted from RCRA's definition of "solid waste." See
42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1995) ("The term 'solid waste' . . . does not
include .. .industrial discharges which are point sources subject
to permits under section 1342 of [the Clean Water Act]."). Signifi-
cantly, this provision does not exempt air emissions which are
subject to permits under the Clean Air Act. Thus, Congress de-
clined to exempt emissions permitted under the Clean Air Act de-
spite the opportunity to do so. Since activities authorized by a
Clean Air Act permit are not exempted from regulation under
RCRA, while activities authorized by other specified statutes are
exempted, it can only be deduced that Congress intended for air
emissions permitted by the Clean Air Act to be regulated under
RCRA.
The instant action should not be misconstrued as an imper-
missible end-run around the limitations on the permit review pro-
cess for the simple reason that this action involves two different
statutes. The permits were issued under the state's Clean Air Act
program, while this action was brought pursuant to the "immi-
nent and substantial endangerment" provision of RCRA. There
exists absolutely no support, either in the case law or statutes, for
the trial court's contention that a plaintiff may not initiate a citi-
zens suit proceeding under one statute because such proceeding
would constitute an end-run around the permit review limits of a
second statute. Buena Vista's "end-run" argument is simply not
supported by existing law under the facts in this case.
Finally, rather than being an alternative source of judicial re-
view, the "imminent and substantial endangerment" provision of
RCRA is really a statutory version of common law public nui-
sance. The plaintiffs in this case are not seeking a review of the
Clean Air Act permits; they are seeking an injunction against an
imminent and substantial endangerment. The court below mis-
characterized the objectives and intentions of the plaintiffs in this
case, and its decision is therefore based in error.
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V(i). SHOULD THIS COURT RULE ON WHETHER
APPELLANTS ARE PRECLUDED BY RCRA
§ 7002(b) OR THE DOCTRINES OF RES
JUDICATA OR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
FROM PURSUING THIS ACTION?
A. The court below did not rule on Buena Vista's motion that
plaintiffs are barred from bringing the instant action on statutory
and res judicata/collateral estoppel grounds because it found other
grounds dispositive to dismiss the suit. However, it is undisputed
that these issues were properly raised below for the court to de-
cide, and were fully argued in the motion below.
In Bennett v. Spear, the Supreme Court held that "[a] respon-
dent is entitled . . .to defend the judgment on any ground sup-
ported by the record." Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 166 (1997);
see also Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 500 (1985). Justice Scalia
stated that it was "an appropriate exercise of [the Court's] discre-
tion" to decide issues that neither the District Court nor the Court
of Appeals had reached "rather than leave them for disposition on
remand." Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. at 166-7.
Similarly, in this case judicial economy would be better served
by disposing of Buena Vista's motion in this court rather than
leaving it for the District Court on remand. The nature of the
questions presented in the motion are purely legal. The relevant
facts have already been found either by the court below or the
state court in Bluepeace, Inc. v. Buena Vista. Because the issues
of section 7002(b) and res judicata/collateral estoppel were prop-
erly raised below, the appellee, Buena Vista, is entitled to defend
the District Court's judgment on those grounds. See Bennett v.
Spear, 520 U.S. at 166. Therefore, this court should rule on the
issues presented.
B. The parties in the instant action are not identical to the
parties in the state action. Accordingly, one of the crucial issues
that must be decided with respect to Buena Vista's motion will be
whether the parties in both actions are in privity, such that a
judgment against one will bar the other from bringing its own ac-
tion. This inquiry will be one of fact, best suited to the trial court.
An appellate court does not generally have the power to re-
view the evidence and make its own findings of fact. See Kelley v.
Everglades Drainage Dist., 319 U.S. 415 (1943). Because the Dis-
trict Court did not reach the issues presented in the motion, it
never engaged in fact finding with respect to the privity of the par-
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ties. When, as in this case, the trial court's findings of fact are
insufficient to permit adequate review, the appellate court should
remand the case and direct the lower court to make the necessary
findings. See Icicle Foods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709
(1986); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. Kamborian, 160 F.2d 461 (1st
Cir. 1947); Lamelson v. Kellogg Co., 440 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1971).
Therefore, this court should not decide the appellee's motion, but
instead should remand the motion to the district court for
decision.
V(ii). ARE THE APPELLANTS PRECLUDED BY RCRA
§ 7002(b), OR THE DOCTRINES OF RES
JUDICATA OR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
FROM PURSUING THIS ACTION BECAUSE
OF THE STATE COURT DECISION IN
BLUEPEACE, INC. V. BUENA VISTA POWER CO.?
A. 1. Diligent Prosecution
Section 7002(b)(2)(C) of RCRA provides that
[no action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this
section if the State, in order to restrain or abate acts or condi-
tions which may have contributed or are contributing to the ac-
tivities which may present the alleged endangerment . . . has
commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action under sub-
section (a)(1)(B) of this section.
42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(C) (1995).
Thus, once the state is "diligently prosecuting" an action to
abate the endangerment, citizen suits are barred. The Supreme
Court in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found.,
Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987), reviewed a similar 'diligent prosecution'
provision under the Clean Water Act and held that this "bar on
citizen suits when governmental enforcement action is under way
suggests that the citizen suit is meant to supplement rather than
to supplant governmental action." Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60. The
Court further noted that the legislative history of the 'diligent
prosecution' provision indicated that "citizen suits are proper only
'if the Federal, State, and local agencies fail to exercise their en-
forcement responsibility."' Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 92-414, at 64
(1971)). Thus, it follows that if the federal, state and local agen-
cies do exercise their enforcement responsibility, citizen suits are
not proper. Given the minimal, "interstitial" role of citizen suits in
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the Supreme Court's Gwaltney decision, it is clear that once the
state diligently engages in enforcement proceedings against the
defendant, the citizen suit becomes superfluous and should be dis-
missed. Id. at 61.
In the instant action, the State of New Union has intervened
in order to exercise its enforcement responsibility under RCRA.
Both New Union and Friends of Lake Tokay are now prosecuting
identical enforcement proceedings, and therefore it cannot even be
claimed that the citizen suit is supplemental to the state's action.
Rather, the citizen suit is merely duplicative of the state's diligent
prosecution. Since New Union is now diligently prosecuting this
action, the citizen suit initiated by Friends of Lake Tokay has be-
come an unnecessary substitute for government action and should
be dismissed.
2. Res Judicata
The doctrine of res judicata holds that "a judgment 'on the
merits' in a prior suit involving the same parties or their privies
bars a second suit based on the same cause of action." Lawlor v.
National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955).
In the instant case, both Friends of Lake Tokay, Inc. and the
State of New Union, while not actually parties in the state action,
are in privity with Bluepeace, Inc., the plaintiff in that suit. In
Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1975), the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held:
[u]nder the federal law of res judicata, a person may be bound
by a judgment even though not a party if one of the parties to
the suit is so closely aligned with his interests as to be his vir-
tual representative.
Aerojet-General Corp., 511 F.2d at 719-20.
The "virtual representation" theory in its broadest form pre-
cludes "relitigation of any issue that had once been adequately
tried by a person sharing a substantial identity of interests with a
nonparty." 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4457.
In the state court action, Bluepeace brought suit against
Buena Vista, inter alia, to abate a public nuisance, namely the
emission of mercury from Buena Vista's power plants. When a
private citizen alleges a public nuisance, the citizen stands in the
position of a "private attorney general." As a private attorney gen-
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eral, the private plaintiff necessarily represents the interests of
the state in order to protect public health. In the first case,
Bluepeace represented the interests of Blue Skies. The interests
of the State of Blue Skies in protecting public health would be
identical to the interests of the State of New Union in protecting
public health. Therefore, Bluepeace's action to abate Buena
Vista's mercury emissions as a private attorney general shares a
"substantial identity of interests" with New Union's claims under
the instant action.
Similarly, Bluepeace and Friends of Lake Tokay, both not-for-
profit environmental groups dedicated to protecting natural re-
sources, share a substantial identity of interests. Because
Bluepeace shares Friends of Lake Tokay's purpose and seeks to
prevent the same harm, Bluepeace is clearly a virtual representa-
tive of Friends of Lake Tokay. Accordingly, Friends of Lake Tokay
should be bound by the action brought against Buena Vista by
Bluepeace. See Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 719-
20 (5th Cir. 1975).
Moreover, for purposes of res judicata, a cause of action, or
"claim" as it is referred to in Restatement (Second) Judgments,
includes "all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defen-
dant arising out of the same transaction or 'series of connected
transactions."' lb MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.410[1] (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS § 24(a)). The
Supreme Court has held that different claims which "derive from
a common nucleus of operative fact" may not be relitigated be-
tween the parties or their privies. United Mineworkers v. Gibb,
383 U.S. 715 (1966). This rule is often understood simply as
prohibiting a plaintiff from splitting his claim.
The instant action under RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B) arises
out of the same nucleus of operative facts which formed the basis
of the action in Bluepeace, namely the discharge of mercury from
the Buena Vista power plants and its subsequent entry into sur-
face water. Under res judicata, the plaintiff must seek in the first
suit all the relief to which he believes he is entitled because the
decision in that case bars a second action alleging alternative re-
lief. In this case, the parties in privity failed to assert the cause of
action under RCRA in the state court action, and the res judicata
prohibition on claim-splitting bars them from litigating it now.
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3. Collateral Estoppel
The instant action is also barred by collateral estoppel. The
doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of the
same issue between parties or their privies. One of the issues fi-
nally decided by the state court was that regulation of mercury air
emissions in the absence of federal standards under the Clean Air
Act should be accomplished through legislative or administrative
processes, not through judicial processes. The parties in privity
are now attempting to relitigate this very same issue by asking
the district court to regulate mercury air emissions in the absence
of federal standards under the Clean Air Act. Accordingly, they
should be estopped from seeking relitigation of the decision
reached on that issue in Bluepeace v. Buena Vista.
B. 1. Diligent Prosecution
Section 7002(b)(2)(C) of RCRA provides that
[n]o action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this
section if the State, in order to restrain or abate acts or condi-
tions which may have contributed or are contributing to the ac-
tivities which may present the alleged endangerment . . . has
commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action under sub-
section (a)(1)(B) of this section.
42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(C) (1995).
As the terms of the statute make clear, citizen suits are
barred under section 7002 (b)(2)(C) only when the state has al-
ready commenced and is diligently prosecuting a similar action. It
is well established that the citizen suit must be filed after the
state action is filed in order to fall under the 'diligent prosecution'
rule of the Clean Water Act. See, e.g., Connecticut Fund for the
Env't v. Job Plating Co., 623 F.Supp. 207 (D. Conn. 1985) (holding
that "loin its face, the diligent prosecution provision of [the Clean
Water Act] does not apply to a case in which the state did not take
any enforcement action until after the citizen suit was filed." Id.
at 215.); Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 617 F.Supp. 1120 (D.
Md. 1985) (holding that the citizen suit "was instituted prior to
the state's institution of administrative proceedings . . . and,
therefore, is not barred by [the 'diligent prosecution' provision] of
the Clean Water Act.") Because the language of RCRA's 'diligent
prosecution' provision follows that of the Clean Water Act, the
holdings of these cases apply to RCRA section 7002(b)(2)(C) as
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well. Therefore, section 7002(b)(2)(C) does not apply to bar citizen
suits initiated prior to the filing of the state action.
Friends of Lake Tokay in this case duly gave notice to the
State of New Union of its intention to bring an imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment suit as required by the statute. After New
Union failed to act within the prescribed period of time, Friends of
Lake Tokay filed its complaint. The State of New Union then
later intervened in the action. The statute in this case only bars
citizens suits commenced after the filing of a state action. See 42
U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(C) (1995). Therefore, the action commenced
by Friends of Lake Tokay may not be dismissed on the grounds
that the State of New Union was diligently prosecuting an action
against Buena Vista.
2. Res Judicata - Collateral Estoppel
The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel cannot be
asserted against the plaintiffs in this case because they were not
in privity with the parties in the first action, and cannot be bound
by the court's decision in that case. It is well established that in-
dividual litigation ordinarily does not preclude litigation by the
government. See City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358
(1975); Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963). While private litiga-
tion may be barred by an action by the government, it is "the gen-
eral principle of law that the [government] will not be barred from
independent litigation by the failure of a private plaintiff." United
States v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 594 F.2d 56, 58-9 (5th
Cir. 1979). Accordingly, even if it was held that Friends of Lake
Tokay was bound by the state court decision in Bluepeace as a
party in privity, the State of New Union is clearly not bound by
that holding, and therefore the instant action is not barred.
Additionally, res judicata does not bar the action in this case
because the claims in both actions do not arise from the same set
of operative facts. The claims in Bluepeace, Inc. v. Buena Vista
arose from mercury contamination in the waters of Lake Mordred,
a lake in the state of Blue Skies. In contrast, the instant action
arises from mercury contamination in Lake Tokay, which is lo-
cated in New Union. Moreover, since the mercury pollution oc-
curred at a different time and in a different state, it cannot be said
to arise "out of the same transaction or 'series of connected trans-
actions."' Because the two actions are not based in the same
"claim," the resolution of one does not preclude the litigation of the
other.
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